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Cooperation has been a focus of intense interest in the biological and social
sciences. Yet in spite of a tremendous effort to develop evolutionary models and
laboratory experiments that explain the existence of cooperation in humans,
relatively little effort has been invested in documenting the prevalence of largescale cooperation in well-mixed populations and the extent to which it may be the
result of biological or social forces. In this article we study voter behaviour as a
form of cooperation that bears close resemblance to theoretical models in which
individuals in a large population make anonymous decisions about whether or not
to contribute to a public good. Matching public voter turnout records to an adult
twin registry, we compare concordance in political behaviour between
monozygotic and dizygotic twins. The results show that the decision to cooperate
by choosing to vote is primarily determined by genetic factors. These results
suggest that humans exhibit genetic variation in their tendency to cooperate and
that biological evolution has played an important role in the development of
political cooperation.
Voting is a classic example of a cooperation problem.1 When one person votes,
everyone with the same preferences benefits from the increased likelihood that their
preferred outcome will result. Yet those who do vote must bear the cost of time and
effort required to learn about the election and go to the polls. In large populations, the
probability that a single vote will change the outcome of an election is miniscule,2
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meaning that even very small costs to the individual typically outweigh the expected
benefits to the individual. As a result, game theoretic models which assume individuals
are self-interested and fully optimizing in their behaviour show that the equilibrium
amount of cooperation (turnout) approaches 0 as the population becomes large.3 Yet in
spite of these predictions millions of people do vote, suggesting that something other
than self-interest and optimizing behaviour drives their decision to cooperate. And the
fact that millions of people abstain suggests that there may be inherent variation in the
human tendency to cooperate.
Empirical models of turnout4-6 typically contain numerous covariates including
demographic factors (age, gender, race, marital status, education, income, occupational
prestige, home ownership), attitudinal and behavioral factors (interest in the campaign,
access to political information, strength of partisanship, feelings of civic duty, internal
and external efficacy, political trust, church attendance, personal skill acquisition,
humanitarianism, altruism, and patience), and institutional factors (closeness of the
election, contact from political organizations, barriers to registration). Yet in spite of
this everything-but-the-kitchen-sink approach, these models usually fit very poorly to
the data. For example, one prominent model includes 32 variables but explains a mere
31% of the variance in turnout.4 Moreover, the theories underlying these models
completely ignore genetic or biological sources of variation. The implication is that
voter turnout is purely an environmental phenomenon.
Recent work in neuroeconomics suggests we should look beyond the environment
to explain political cooperation. In fMRI studies of behaviour in trust and social
dilemma games, cooperation activates areas of the brain that have been linked with
reward processing7,8, suggesting that the brain has developed a mechanism to override
self-interest in cooperation dilemmas. Cooperation in trust games also appears to
increase in the presence of oxytocin9 which reduces activation of the amygdala’s fear
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response.10 Thus, variation in biophysical attributes like hormone levels and brain
function may help to explain variation in cooperative behaviour. However, the
neuroeconomics literature leaves open the question of whether biophysical differences
in cooperation result primarily from environmental or genetic factors.
In order to estimate the degree to which cooperation is heritable, we study the
turnout behaviour of (identical) monozygotic (MZ) and (non-identical) dizygotic (DZ)
twins. MZ twins share 100% of their genes, while DZ twins share only 50% on
average. Thus, if political cooperation is based in part on genetic characteristics, then
MZ twins should exhibit more concordance (both twins vote or both twins abstain) than
DZ twins. Moreover, if we assume that MZ twins and DZ twins share comparable
environments, then we can use these concordances to estimate explicitly the relative
importance of genetic, shared environmental, and unshared environmental factors (see
Methods).
Some scholars have objected to the assumption in twin studies that MZ and DZ
environments are comparable, arguing that MZ twins tend to be more strongly affiliated
and more influenced by one another than DZ twins. However, studies of twins raised
together have been validated by studies of twins reared apart,11 and personality and
cognitive differences between MZ and DZ twins persist even among twins whose
zygosity has been miscategorized by their parents.12 Moreover, contrary to the
expectation that the environment would decrease concordance over time, MZ twins
living apart tend to become more similar with age.12
To assess the impact of genetics on turnout, we obtained electronic voter
registration records for 3.8 million voters from Los Angeles County with complete vote
histories for 8 elections (three primary, two statewide, and three general) from 20002005 and matched them to the Southern California Twin Registry,13 a volunteer adult
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registry of MZ and DZ twins who live in the Los Angeles area. Records were matched
by surname, first name, birthdate, place of birth, and zip code. Full matches were
automatically included in our data. Partial matches on three or more of these attributes
were manually checked and included in the data if the failure to match fully was
determined to be the result of a typographical error. This procedure yielded vote
histories and party of registration for 399 twins from same-sex pairs (172 MZ twins and
102 DZ twins in matched pairs, and 78 MZ and 47 DZ “singletons” where we found one
twin in the pair but not the other—although singletons cannot help us estimate betweentwin concordance, including these observations in the data does help us to estimate the
mean turnout rate among twins for each election (see Methods).
A principal advantage of this approach is the use of field evidence based on thirdparty observations of actual voter behaviour rather than self-reports. This kind of data
is rarely used in twin studies and is an especially important source for evaluating
political cooperation since a significant number of individuals who did not vote
typically report that they did.14 However, there are also some limitations. About 30%
of the adult population in Los Angeles County is not registered to vote, so we cannot
include them in our sample. Since registration itself may be an act of political
cooperation, this means our sample may be somewhat more cooperative than the
population. However, focusing on registered individuals allows us to exclude those
who might generate false concordance because they are ineligible to vote due to foreign
citizenship status or criminal records. We also note that mean turnout rates were
slightly higher in our sample than in the population, though turnout rates between MZ
and DZ twins did not differ significantly (see supplementary information).
Results
Mean concordance in the pooled turnout observations using polychoric correlation
was significantly higher (p=0.006) in the MZ twins (0.71) than the DZ twins (0.50).
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However, naïve correlation measures are only a crude guide since they make no
provision for multiple observations of each twin. Instead, we conduct a mixed-effects
Bayesian ACE analysis which uses observed turnout decisions to estimate a latent
tendency to cooperate for each twin, which itself is a function of latent heritability (A),
common environment (C), and unshared environmental (E) factors. We then rescale the
estimated ACE factors to sum to one in order to estimate what portion of variance in the
tendency to vote is due to each factor (see Methods).
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Figure 1. Ternary diagram of 10,000 draws from posterior Bayesian distribution
of estimated components of variance in voter turnout (left panel) and party
affiliation (right panel). The probability that the true coefficients lie outside the
region of these draws is p=0.0001. The mean of the distribution is noted by the
blue solid circle. These results suggest that heritability plays a significant role in
political behaviour. Variation in political cooperation (turnout) is more than half
heritable, while variation in political affiliation (partisanship) is only about onefifth heritable.
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Fig.1 shows the posterior distribution of the estimated factors. About 53% (95%
C.I. 23%,73%) of the variance in turnout behaviour can be explained by genetic factors.
The environment also plays a role, but the unshared environment accounts for much
more variance (30%, C.I. 22%,39%) than the shared environment (17%, C.I. 1%, 43%).
These results are based on data that pool same-sex male and female pairs. When we
conduct the same analysis on each gender separately we do not find significant
differences in the estimates. The genetic component for males is 51% (95% C.I.
6%,79%) and for females is 59% (95% C.I. 19%,81%).
To check the validity of the method we used to collect the data and conduct the
analysis, we also estimated a mixed-factor Bayesian model of affiliation with a political
party. Fig.1 shows that genetics plays only a small role in partisanship, explaining just
22% of the variance (95% C.I. 14%,36%). This result is consistent with earlier findings
in the Virginia 30k study that show genes explain about 14% of the variance in selfreported party affiliation.15
Note that the contrasting findings for voter turnout and party affiliation would be
difficult to explain with the hypothesis that parental or mutual influence causes MZ
twins to be more alike than DZ twins (i.e. their shared environments are not
comparable). If so, then we would need to be able to explain why this influence is so
strong for political cooperation and so weak for party affiliation, which would be
especially puzzling in light of vast evidence that party affiliation is primarily learned
from one’s parents.16 We also note that in our sample MZ twins are actually less likely
than DZ twins to live at the same address (40% vs. 49%) or in the same zip code (50%
vs. 52%). Thus, greater concordance in MZ twins is probably not due to higher
frequency of contact.
Discussion
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To a certain degree, these results should not be surprising. Scholars have already
documented a genetic basis for altruism and prosocial behavior17,18 and these behaviours
in turn have been linked to voter turnout.19-21 However, social scientists (outside of the
field of psychology) have been extremely reluctant to admit a role for genetic and
biological factors in political phenomena which has biased scholarly interpretations of
several important phenomena.
For example, if political cooperation is determined in part by genetics, it would
conform to two well-known features of voting behaviour. First, parental turnout
behaviour has been shown to be one of the strongest predictors of turnout behaviour in
young adults.4 Although this has previously been interpreted as the result of social
influence, the findings here suggest it may be mostly due to heritability since the shared
environment appears to play only a small role. Second, turnout behavior has been
shown to be habitual—people typically either always vote or always abstain.4,22-26
Scholars previously interpreted this as the result of reinforcement learning, but given the
small effect of environmental variation it might also be primarily due to inherent genetic
variability.
More importantly, our results have general implications for the vast literature on
cooperation in humans. Although previous laboratory studies examined cooperation
between twins, 27,28 none has focussed on the question of how twins cooperate with
unrelated members of the general population. Thus, this article represents the first
attempt to estimate the genetic basis of cooperative behaviour in large, well-mixed
populations. The results suggest that humans are endowed with genetic variation in
their tendency to cooperate, which supports theoretical models in which cooperators and
noncooperators coexist. This would tend to favour evolutionary models which yield
polymorphic equilibria29 or heteroclinic cycles30 over those that predict monomorphic
populations of cooperators or defectors.
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Our results also support models which suggest the evolution of cooperative
behaviour is not merely the result of social evolution—instead, cooperation may result
from the co-evolution of genetic and cultural characteristics.31 Although here we
assume genetic and environmental factors are additively separable, the strong influence
of genetic factors suggests that more detailed models of the interaction of genes and
culture (G x E models) are likely to identify a significant role for genes in the evolution
of cooperation.
Finally, our results have important implications for recent work in
neuroeconomics. Scholars have linked several areas of the brain7,8 and some hormonal
responses9,10 to the tendency to cooperate. However, these studies do not indicate
whether variation in cooperation across individuals is due to environmental or genetic
influences on the physiological development of the brain and endocrine systems. Our
results suggest an important role for genetic evolution in the development of
physiological systems that contribute to an individual’s willingness to cooperate.

Methods
The most popular method of fitting variance component models to twin data is
maximum likelihood estimation of structural equations models. An alternative
approach is to formulate the twin model as a linear mixed effects model if the
phenotype is continuous or a generalized mixed effects for a discrete phenotype.32,33
Generalized mixed effects models are simply generalized linear models with continuous
random effects. Models of discrete phenotypes present computational challenges for
structural equation modelling software packages because the likelihoods contain
integrals that cannot be evaluated in closed form and thus must be evaluated
numerically. The maximum likelihood estimation of complex models with many
random effects requires repeated numerical evaluation of high-dimension integrals.33
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As a result, researchers have begun to use Bayesian models implemented using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo algorithms. These algorithms evaluate the high-dimension integrals
using random draws rather than directly.
The application of Bayesian inference to genetic models has begun to receive
widespread attention within the literature. Recent studies have successfully applied
Bayesian methods to binary data,33 survival analysis,34 nonlinear developmental change
and GxE interaction,35 item response theory,36 longitudinal models,37 and multivariate
models for ordinal data.38
Simple polychoric DZ and MZ correlations for the sample suggest the appropriate
model for turnout should account for additive genetic, shared environmental, and nonshared environmental effects. This model is known as an ACE model. We can specify
this model as a generalized linear fixed-effects model where subject j is a member of
family i and voting in election k. The link function g reflects the fact that we believe the
underlying variable, the propensity to vote, is a continuous variable that we are only
able to measure categorically.
g(MZ Phenotypeij) = µk + Ai + Ci + Eij
g(DZ Phenotypeij) = µk + A1i + A2ij + Ci + Eij
The µk is a parameter that controls for election-specific variation in voter turnout.
A1 and A2 are additive genetic effects, C is the shared environmental effect, and E the
unshared environmental effect. In mixed models A1, A2, C, and E are modelled as
random effects and µ as a fixed effect. The additive genetic effect is split into two
constituent parts to account for the difference in genetic covariance between MZ and
DZ twins (the genetic variance is the same for MZ and DZ twins, but the genetic
covariance for MZs is twice as large as DZs because they share twice as many genes).
As in previous literature, we assume that the random effects are normally distributed:
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A1~N(0, var(A)/2), A2~N(0,var(A)/2), C~N(0,var(C)), and E~N(0,var(E)) where A is
the total additive genetic effect. We use vague priors to ensure they do not drive model
results (a mean-zero normal distribution with variance 1,000,000 for µ and a uniform
distribution on [0,1000] for the square root of var(A), var(C), and var(E)).
We employed a threshold model assuming a normally-distributed latent
propensity to vote.33 This latent variable is linked to the observed decision to vote or
abstain via a step function. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, the total
variance of the latent variable must be fixed for identification. We achieve this by
constraining the variance of the unshared environment var(E) to equal one and then
using the estimates of var(A) and var(C) to derive the proportion of variance generated
by each factor. We also estimate the population means by fixing the threshold to zero.
To detect convergence in the estimates we ran two MCMC chains and applied a BrooksGelman test to the ouput.39 The ‘potential scale reduction factors’ for each variable in
our simulations were reduced to 1.1 or less by the 40,000th draw, indicating
convergence. To sample the posterior we discarded the first 50,000 draws and kept
every 100th draw from the next 500,000 draws from each of the two chains. Test
results drawn from 2 million draws yielded identical estimates.
To analyze party affiliation, we follow the same procedure as for turnout, except
there is only one observation per individual so we set k={1}. A substantial number of
individuals reported no party affiliation and in rare cases they reported party affiliations
other than the two major parties. The results reported in the paper treat party of
affiliation as a dichotomous variable to maintain comparability with results from the
Virginia 30k (Republicans are coded as 1 and others as 0, but identical results are
obtained when we code Democrats as 1 and others as 0).
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Supplementary material

All twins
(N=399)
MZ twins
(N=250)
DZ twins
(N=149)
Population
(N=3.8 million)

3/2000
primary
0.54

11/2000
general
0.76

3/2002
primary
0.36

11/2002
general
0.57

10/2003
statewide
0.68

3/2004
primary
0.44

11/2004
general
0.84

11/2005
statewide
0.46

0.55

0.75

0.36

0.58

0.71

0.42

0.86

0.49

0.53

0.79

0.37

0.56

0.62

0.46

0.80

0.42

0.48

0.68

0.26

0.45

0.55

0.38

0.79

0.47

Table 1. Comparison of turnout rates in twin sample and general population in
Los Angeles County, by election
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